



**MINISTÈRE
DES ARMÉES**

*Liberté
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ANNALES DU CONCOURS

Accès au corps des attachés
de la DGSE

Épreuve d'admissibilité :
anglais



Session 2021



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2^{ème} épreuve d'admissibilité

Anglais

Épreuve d'anglais constituée d'une série de quatre questions à réponse courte traitant de problématiques dans les domaines européen, international et économique, rédigées en langue anglaise et nécessitant une réponse rédigée en langue anglaise. Chaque question peut être accompagnée d'un ou plusieurs documents en rapport avec la question posée qui n'excèdent pas une page au total.



Durée : 2 heures - coefficient 3

CONCOURS EXTERNE POUR L'ACCÈS AU CORPS DES ATTACHÉS

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Vous répondrez en anglais à chacune des questions ci-dessous. Chaque question est notée sur 5 points.

Questions :

- 1) In the last few years, the concept of digital technologies as inherently unbiased conduits for information sharing has been shattered. Geopolitical events have magnified the capabilities of Big Tech to influence public discourse, while civil and political institutions have struggled, quite visibly, to keep pace. How can open societies, which promote and, to varying degrees, protect the free distribution of information, remain stable with threats to national security and domestic stability emanating from the same digital spaces?
- 2) With Brexit formally set in motion, and Germany's post-Merkel future still uncertain, do you agree with the idea that France is emerging as the most politically influential nation in Europe? Why or why not?
- 3) Cyber attacks are increasingly being fueled by global geopolitical tensions. Since 2005, at least 33 countries have been suspected of conducting publicly known, state-sponsored cyber activity operations, with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea accounting for 77 percent of this activity. National security, military capabilities, and economic prosperity can also be compromised by the theft of trade secrets, proprietary data, and intellectual property housed in the private sector. How can governments and businesses protect themselves from such attacks today?
- 4) Is Russia edging out France in Africa ?



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Copie ayant obtenu la meilleure note

Anglais

L'administration n'a volontairement pas corrigé les imperfections de fond et de forme dans les copies communiquées ci-après.



Année : 2021

Concours : accès au corps des
attachés (externe)

Épreuve : Anglais

Consignes :

- Ne pas signer la composition et ne pas y apporter de signe distinctif
- Numéroté chaque page; placer l'ensemble dans l'ordre et le bon sens
- N'effectuer aucun collage ou découpage de sujets ou de feuilles
- Ne joindre aucun brouillon

Question 1

The growing influence of Big tech on public discourse and the return of competition between great (and regional) powers are mixing, jeopardizing the national security and the domestic stability in open societies like Western democracies.

Nonetheless, Big Tech companies are balking at efforts made by political institutions to address the threats emanating from digital space.

In order to keep promoting and protecting the free distribution of information while addressing the threats posed by such a mix, Western democracies have a large set of options, ranging from responding to the countries using social media meddling as a weapon, cracking down Big Tech to focusing on education.

In its International Digital Strategy unveiled by Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Foreign Minister, at Aix-en-Provence in the course of 2017, France advocates for a free and neutral internet. In the same speech delivered to present this strategy, Jean-Yves Le Drian talked-up "information manipulation", fleshing out that he preferred that wording over "fake news": the former expresses the idea of a malicious act that is part

of a strategy. A few months later, a joint report published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense named "Information manipulation" established that these kind of acts are part of the new "hybrid war" that is being waged on several scales. Lastly, Ministry of Defense published a new policy document about its new cyberoffensive strategy.

Currently, EU Commission is exploring how to rein in Big Tech in order to protect EU citizens. The General Regulation on Personal Data is already a big step but it needs to be associated with new regulations: amid growing influence of Big Tech, the EU Commission services are working on two new regulations, the Digital Service Act and the Digital Market Act. There is still fine tuning to do but the regulations should enter into force in the course of 2022.

Last but not least, the crisis open societies are mixed in is a cognitive one. Science has lost its supremacy over opinion and this is as much a testament of Big Tech's growing influence on public discourse as it is of a lack of education on social media issues.

Enhancing education, starting with kids, could prevent future generations from the danger posed by social media in the time of Great powers competition.

By and large, not taking any of the steps mentioned above is a recipe for disaster.

Question 2

In a speech delivered at La Sorbonne during the course of 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron laid out the path of a "united, democratic and sovereign" Europe. By doing so, the French political leader wanted to make France at the center of EU's fate. Coronavirus outbreak (and its effects and the fiscal rules), Brexit and Post-Nerkeel Germany may help France become the most influential nation in Europe. This is all the more so true that French discourse on "autonomous strategy" is welcomed by its transatlantic ally which is keen on sharing the burden of Europe's security. However, there are a few elements that qualify such a statement.

From a diplomatic standpoint, France looks like it is the most influential nation in Europe. In the midst of the outbreak, it convinced Germany to rubber-stamp a 750 billion € stimulus package while certain country (e.g. Netherlands) were adamant that there will be no stimulus package at all.

Considering military power, France is now the most prominent army in Europe since Great-Britain left the Union. This makes it credible when it comes to security at EU's southern border. Besides, its military programming law for 2019-2025 urges public authorities to mobilize its european allies in order to develop new military projects.

Also, at the outset of a transatlantic thaw, France looks like Washington's strongest ally in Europe: Paris and Washington worked hand in hand in seeking to fight

Jihadism in the Sahel. In a time where the United States are turning their gaze to China and Putin stepping back from the Cold, France may be the cornerstone of Europe's security.

Despite these elements indicating that France has a momentum and could be looked at as the most politically influential nation in Europe, other elements tend to point out to the fact that this influence will ought to be shared.

On the one hand, the new German coalition formed by Olaf Scholz has a strong European agenda. Therefore, Scholz will likely try to fill the void created by Angela Merkel's departure. Also, Viktor Orban declared recently that "the Gloves are off" now that Merkel is gone. Macron and Scholz will have to put up a fight, seconded in that by the European Commission in order to prevent the bloc's legal order from unraveling.

On the other hand, Draghi's return to office in Italy will likely help the latter gain political influence. As an example, Norio Draghi set up an exceptional meeting during G20 in Rome to discuss Afghanistan. However, France and Italy are seeing themselves as allies: this was embodied by the signing of the Quinimal Treaty earlier this year.

France might be one of the most influential nation in Europe but it is not the most influential one given Italy's and Germany's momentum.

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The French Strategic Actualization published in January, 2021 by the General Secretariat of Defense and National Security discuss the cyberthreat posed by a few enemy states but also by allies. A large number of sectors are prone to cyber activity operations. Revelations about NSO group clients and their activities sparked a wide disarray among the political class. The US government placed NSO Group on its entity list, preventing it from operating in the United States. This is an example of governments can protect national cyber security. But, given that this threat also applies to private sector, the issue should be dealt with in both terms of intelligence services capabilities and businesses awareness of the danger.

Western intelligence services should be given the technical abilities to identify, prevent and counter cyber attacks. Doing so also implies to beef up the ties between these services and cyber security firms. However, intelligence services should prefer national cyber security firm over foreign security firms. In a broader way, public authorities should create an innovation-friendly

environment in order to benefit from the private sector's innovation.

Firms should be aware of the large array of threats emanating from cyber space. Executives have to be trained by professionals given that they are targeted by foreign intelligence services. For example, when they travel through Tel Aviv or JFK airports, they are likely to be searched and detained while their computers are being analyzed (at best) or infected (at worst). Also, when travelling to hostile countries (China, Russia, Iran), they should be made aware of the possible cyber surveillance set up by the local intelligence service.

To conclude, protecting national interests (both political and economical) can be achieved through the increase of intelligence services' technical abilities, which cannot be decoupled from private sector's innovation process, and by raising awareness among sensitive firms' executives or middle managers.

Last month, a United Nations Security Council delegation headed to Bamako to discuss the political transition that is stretching from 2020 summer till now. In the wake of this visit, Paris and Washington reiterated their official and strong opposition to any contract between Malian government and the Evgeny Prigozhin-owned private military society Wagner. Along the disinformation campaign launched by the same company in the Republic of Central Africa toward French presence, this potential contract is a cause for concern in Paris. It appears that Russia, which cannot compete with Paris in terms of economic involvement and public aid to development, is trying to build on the discontent that Paris is facing in Africa.

Sergei Lavrov, long-serving Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, convinced Putin to develop an African policy. Amid a Western-Russia chill, this policy went against Paris interest in several locations. In Libya, Russian support to Khalifa Haftar exceeded the needs of the counterterrorism fight: it helped the Marechal launch a large scale offensive on Tripoli and largely violated the UN embargo on arms. By doing so, Russia gained influence over an actor that France was eager to support when he fought against the Islamic State in Derna. In Central Africa (RCA, Benin) but also in Mali, Russia is fueling the hatred of France in order to replace it as a security provider. Wagner uses online disinformation campaign to achieve such a purpose. In Mali, the Wagner contract was the cause for a diplomatic feud between Paris and Bamako, keeping in mind that France intervened in Mali

at the express request of the Italian government in 2013 and that this intervention is sanctioned by a UNSC resolution. Nevertheless, France cannot stay in Mali forever and French President announced that Barkhane will need to shrink progressively. However, France and the EU will stay in Mali with the Takuba Task force format.

Even if it tries to edge France out of Africa, Russia cannot stand the comparison in terms of economic involvement and public development aid. French companies (Orano, Vinci, Bouygue, EDF) are well implanted in Africa, be it French-speaking Africa or English-speaking Africa. As an example, France is deepening its civil nuclear cooperation with South-Africa. The area is also the top-priority of the French Development Agency and its General Director Pierrick Rioux. Moreover, Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Minister of Foreign Affairs is defending a bill set to push up the financial aid to Africa for the foreseeable future. 19 African countries will concentrate most of the increase. Also, EU Commission announced the European Global Gateway strategy which intends to mobilize 300 billion € in public and private funds in order to build 5G network, optic fiber cables, port and airports, chiefly in Africa to counter the Belt and Road Initiative but also to prevent Russia from gaining economical influence through political one, if any.

One may argue that Russia can only try to edge France out of Africa given the strong ties the former developed with the latter.