

**CONCOURS EXTERNE ET INTERNE POUR L'ACCÈS A  
L'EMPLOI DE SECRÉTAIRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES  
(CADRE GÉNÉRAL ET CADRE D'ORIENT)  
AU TITRE DE L'ANNÉE 2022**

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**ÉPREUVES ÉCRITES D'ADMISSIBILITÉ**

**Jeudi 23 septembre 2021**

**ANGLAIS**

Durée totale de l'épreuve : 3 heures

Coefficient : 2

Toute note globale inférieure à 10 sur 20 est éliminatoire

Barème de notation : composition en anglais 12 points ; traduction en français 8 points



*Composition en anglais à partir d'une question, rédigée dans cette même langue,  
liée à l'actualité (500 mots avec une tolérance de plus ou moins 10%)*

**SUJET :**

**Discuss the following question:**

***“Who are the winners and losers of ‘vaccine diplomacy’?”***

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**TRADUCTION EN FRANÇAIS**

*Traduction en français d'un texte rédigé en anglais*

**TEXTE AU VERSO**

## France needs Britain more than ever

By John Keiger

12 May 2021, The Spectator

(...)President Macron's risky strategy of accelerating the process of ever-deeper European integration has the advantage of denying Germany (but also France) sovereignty: the same Faustian pact that President Mitterrand sealed in Maastricht, fearful of the long-term consequences of German reunification after 1989. But the risk — as many in France know — is that continued French economic and financial decline will further loosen Paris's grip on the EU while tightening Berlin's. Germany risks becoming — reluctantly — the natural European hegemon that France has always feared.

The one significant domain where France has the upper hand over Germany is in the military and international fields, by dint of nuclear weapons, reactive and combatant armed forces and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, none of which Germany has. In this France is similar to Britain. The century-old military association with Britain, albeit not a formal peacetime alliance, is a French force multiplier and insurance policy. Hence in recent times, the 1998 Saint-Malo declaration and the 2010 Lancaster House agreement both seriously irked Berlin.

This is why Paris has more to lose than London from a serious deterioration of their relations. Without this force multiplier, France would be hobbled internationally and eventually have little alternative but to throw her military lot in with Germany and the 'political dwarf and military worm' that is the EU. However much Macron might call for a European army he knows this will not happen in the next ten years, if ever.

Even Macron knows that it is in France's 'vital' interest to maintain tight defence and security relations with Britain, as the most recent French defence white paper explicitly states. This is why — regardless of Brexit — Britain looms so large in Macron's 2017 grand strategic review that seeks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific and why Macron was so looking forward to celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Lancaster House agreement last year.

That treaty goes further on defence and security partnership (including nuclear weapons, advanced arms construction, joint force projection) than with any other European power. An example of this is Britain's frontline support to France with heavy-lift helicopter capacity and crewing in the Sahel, where EU support is minimal. There is no way France would wish to jeopardise this strategic support and long term insurance policy.

It is always a popular pastime on both sides of the Channel to do some English or French bashing for domestic political reasons. But Paris should be reminded not to overstep the mark. Britain has not leveraged the Lancaster House agreement in any visible way but France is building up a lot of political debt. London should call in that debt soon.

*John Keiger is a former professor of French history at the University of Cambridge*